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ABSTRACT
Jamming techniques require just moderate resources to be
deployed, while their effectiveness in disrupting communica-
tions is unprecedented. In this paper we introduce several
contributions to jamming mitigation. In particular, we in-
troduce a novel adversary model that has both (unlimited)
jamming reactive capabilities as well as powerful (but lim-
ited) proactive jamming capabilities. Under this powerful
but yet realistic adversary model, the communication band-
width provided by current anti-jamming solutions drops to
zero.
We then present Silence is Golden (SiG): a novel anti jam-
ming protocol that, introducing a tunable, asymmetric com-
munication channel, is able to mitigate the adversary capa-
bilities, enabling the parties to communicate. For instance,
with SiG it is possible to deliver a 128 bits long message
with a probability greater than 99% in 4096 time slots in
the presence of a jammer that jams all the on-the-fly com-
munications and the 74% of the silent radio spectrum—while
competing proposals simply fail.
The provided solution enjoys a thorough theoretical analysis
and is supported by extensive experimental results, showing
the viability of our proposal.
1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications are prone to several kinds of at-
tacks due to the shared nature of the radio channel. Jam-
ming is one of the most effective denial of service attack that
might be performed in such a scenario [20]. Jamming is a
general term that refers to several disruptive radio activi-
ties aiming at either to interfere or to prevent communica-
tions. While jamming originated in the military scenario,
it is nowadays a threat also to civilian communications [19].
There are mainly two reasons for the widespread diffusion of
jamming as a DoS attack in the wireless scenario: the first
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one is its effectiveness; the other one is that its implementa-
tion does not require specialized hardware. For instance, a
cheap WiFi radio can be used to generate collisions with the
on-the-fly packets so that the receiver cannot decode them
[4]; or, the same radio might be used to occupy the trans-
mission channel in such a way that the transmitter cannot
even start a new communication [23]. In the last decade,
jamming devices have been evolved into high power random
noise transmitters, making the activity of jamming a dread-
ful threat for wireless communications. As an example, we
observe that military equipments implement band jamming
by transmitting a white noise signal of 100W power over
several frequency bands between 20 and 2483 Mhz [15].
Different jamming strategies have been deployed during the
years [6]. The jammer might target the transmitter side by
performing the so called noise-spoofing, i.e., the transmitter
never senses a clear radio channel and therefore never starts
a new transmission. Conversely, the jammer might target
the receiver side, i.e., noise jamming. Noise jamming inter-
feres with the current on-the-fly message introducing several
errors or even making it not receivable. Different radio tech-
niques are possible in order to interfere with the transmitter
and the receiver radios [20]: the jammer might perform a
tone jamming by generating a sinusoidal waveform whose
power is concentrated on the target carrier frequency or it
might perform a band jamming by spreading a flat spectrum
power in the bandwidth of interest.
Jammers can be categorized in two main families: proactive
and reactive. The proactive jammer randomly jams A of the
F available frequencies in the radio spectrum, and there-
fore, the transmitter/receiver pair has only F −A frequency
bands in order to communicate. The solutions dealing with
the proactive jammer implement a strategy based on a trial-
and-fail communication process in random frequency slots.
Conversely, the reactive jammer is more effective, in fact, it
jams the communication after it has sensed it. The reactive
jammer senses the radio spectrum and jams the communi-
cations as soon as they appear on-the-air. Dealing with a
reactive jammer is more difficult: the sense-and-jam behav-
ior is always disruptive, and so far, all the proposed solu-
tions leverage a bounded jammer model, e.g., the size of the
jammed area, the reaction time, the number of the jammed
frequencies.
Contribution. In this work we provide several contribu-
tions: first, we introduce a novel type of adversary. Our
adversary combines both reactive and proactive jamming
capabilities. As a reactive jammer, it is able to disrupt all
the on-the-air communications in the available spectrum. In
fact, in this capacity, we assume it is able to perform both
a network and a spectrum wide sensing and to react with
a jamming signal emitted without delay with respect to the
transmission sender. As a proactive jammer, our adversary
is able to jam additional (apparently) not used frequency
slots in the radio spectrum. To the best of our knowledge,
these are the most strongest assumptions ever made in the
literature for a radio jammer. The second contribution is
the definition of the SiG protocol. Our proposal is, to the
best of our knowledge, the only one able to thwart the pow-
erful, yet viable, adversary above introduced. For instance,
against the introduced adversary, the SiG protocol enables
the transmitter to successfully deliver a 128 bits long mes-
sage within 4096 time slots while other solutions in the lit-
erature, cannot guarantee any communications at all.
Further, the SiG protocol is fully detailed, showing how to
tune its parameters in order to trade-off communication ca-
pabilities with an efficient usage of the transmission slots.
Moreover, a thorough analysis of its capabilities is provided,
together with a comparison against anti-jamming state of
the art solutions. Finally, an extensive simulation campaign
supports our findings.
Section 3 introduces our reference scenario, defining the trans-
mitter, the receiver, and the adversary model. Section 4
presents a simplified version of the SiG protocol, which is
subsequently detailed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, that intro-
duce the frequency hopping scheme and the error correcting
codes, respectively. Section 5 provides a detailed decryption
of the SiG protocol and Section 6 shows the performance
of SiG by means of a theoretical analysis and simulation
results. Finally, Section 7 compares SiG with other recent
solutions to jamming attacks. Some concluding remarks are
reported in Section 8.
2. RELATED WORK
In the following, we review the most relevant anti-jamming
techniques. We consider both proactive and reactive anti-
jamming techniques, and finally, we recall an early solution
that leverages jamming to communicate between peers.
2.1 Proactive jamming
An early analysis on the feasibility of launching and detect-
ing jamming attacks in wireless networks is proposed in [25].
Authors provide an in-deep study about the problem of con-
ducting radio interference attacks on wireless networks, and
examine the critical issue of diagnosing the presence of jam-
ming attacks. They consider different adversarial models
and run real test-beds to measure the adversarial perfor-
mance. They show that by using signal strength, carrier
sensing time, or the packet delivery ratio individually, it
might difficult to conclude the presence of a jammer.
Many solutions have been proposed against proactive jam-
mers. We identify two main families: the “keyed” [11] and
the “key-less” [17]. The former leverages a pre-shared secret
in order to generate frequency hopping sequences (unknown
to the jammer), while the latter leverages a delay between
the sender and receivers in order to make them converging on
a shared transmission frequency. Authors in [12][11] propose
the Time Delayed Broadcast Scheme (TDBS): a broadcast
communication is achieved by means of a sequence of uni-
cast communications—sometimes assisted by proxies. The
solution relies on long frequency hopping sequences that are
pre-loaded in each sensor belonging to the network before
nodes deployment. A key-less solution is presented in [17].
Authors propose to deliver a message between two peers by
an uncoordinated spread spectrum technique while intro-
ducing a delay between the transmitter and the receiver in
order to have them synched. Finally, an early key-less so-
lution is from [2]. Authors leveraged specialized ultra-wide
band radios in order to transmit short impulses. Such com-
munication scheme is difficult to jam, i.e., so far radio im-
pulse cannot be cancelled with an inverse waveform. Each
bit of the message is coded with a time-delayed radio im-
pulse, nevertheless spurious impulses (errors) might appear
at the receiver side due to noise fluctuations or malicious
entities, and the previous produces an enormous increase in
the computational cost that is exponential in the size of the
message.
2.2 Reactive jamming
Reactive jamming involves the activity of sensing the chan-
nel and subsequently switching the radio to the jamming
status. As for reactive-jamming, the current state of the art
solutions do not deal directly with the jammer but leverage
either space or temporal bounds the adversary is subject to.
Authors in [13] propose to exploit the reaction time of the re-
active jammer in order to enable communication; they argue
that the jamming activity needs more than ts = 1ms while
radio switching needs other tc = 50µs, while the transmit-
ter has already sent R(ts+tc) bits—assuming a transmission
rate R. The receiver collects all the bits that are transmit-
ted by the sender but not jammed by the reactive jammer,
and assembles them to construct the original message.
In [26], author propose a combined solution that involves
both locating the reactive jammer and deactivating the nodes
that trigger its activity. Authors observe that the reactive
jamming activity is particularly disruptive in dense WSNs.
Indeed, the reactive jammer is triggered by a specific node,
while the jamming signal will eventually prevent all the com-
munications of the nodes in the jammer neighborhood. In
order to avoid this, authors propose a solution where nodes
cooperate in order to estimate the jammer position, and sub-
sequently enforce the radio-silence of the nodes that trigger
the jamming activity.
Another solution to reactive jamming is POWJAM [9]. Au-
thor proposes short-distance transmissions (with low power)
between peers in order to hidden the transmitter to the reac-
tive jammer. Each long-range communication turns out to
be implemented by a sequence of multi-hop transmissions
characterized by low-distance propagation and therefore a
low probability to be sensed by the jammer.
An efficient and fair MAC protocol robust to reactive inter-
ference has been proposed in [1] and subsequently extended
in [19]. The proposed protocol is robust to both internal
and external interference requiring no knowledge about the
number of participants, nevertheless the authors bound the
reactive jamming activity to (1− ǫ)-portion of the available
time slots.
Another interesting solution comes from [24]. There, au-
thors design, prototype, and evaluate a system for cancelling
the jamming signal: the system combines a mechanical beam-
forming design with an auto-configuration algorithm and
a software radio digital interference cancellation algorithm.
The mechanical beam-forming uses a custom-designed two-
elements antenna architecture and an iterative algorithm for
jammer signal identification and cancellation.
Finally, an interesting solution is provided in [3]. The sce-
nario involves 4 nodes and a slotted channel: two legitimate
peers communicate to each others by transmitting messages
on the shared channel, while one of the illegitimate users
interferes/jams the legitimate messages. Now, the other il-
legitimate peer decides a reception of a “1” when a collision
is detected, while decides for “0” when the slot is empty or
filled up by a legitimate message. Authors prove that the
status of the channel, i.e., jammed or not-jammed, can be
used to communicate one bit of information.
3. SCENARIO
We consider a wireless communication scenario constituted
by a point-to-point link between a transmitter (T ) and a
receiver (R), where T wants to deliver a message m consti-
tuted by Lm bits to R. We assume m ∈ Φ, where Φ is a
dictionary shared between T and R (note that such a dic-
tionary could be the set of correct English words). Further,
we assume the radio spectrum as constituted by F differ-
ent frequency bands (channels), i.e., {f0, . . . , fF−1}. Both
the transmitter and the receiver share a pre-loaded secret s0.
Generally speaking, R could receive from T —due to the
jamming activity and the radio noise— a message m′, such
that m′ 6= m. The SiG protocol guarantees (with a given,
tunable, probability) to recover m. In the following, we as-
sumem to be constituted by a few bits, e.g., Lm ∈ {128, 256, 512}
bits—e.g. m could carry commands or geographical coordi-
nates.
Further, we assume that T and R are loosely time syn-
chronized [8] and that time is divided into slots, i.e., i ∈
[0, . . . ,∞[. Finally, we do not assume any specific or pow-
erful hardware configuration at both T and R — the SiG
protocol only needs the computation of a cryptographically
secure hash function [7] and the capability to run a symmet-
ric encryption algorithm such as AES [14].
Table 1 shows a resume of the symbols and acronyms used
throughout this paper.
3.1 Transmitter and Receiver: Software and
Hardware Assumptions
Transmitter. We consider a standard off-the-shelf radio
transmitter such as a WiFi, or a GPRS/UMTS radio device.
Without loosing of generality, in the following we consider
a radio technology characterized by F = 124 different com-
munication channels (like in the GSM-850). At each time
slot i, the transmitter chooses a pseudo-random frequency
fi
$
←− [f0, . . . , fF−1], and as it will be clear in the following,
it decides whether to stay silent or to transmit the message
m, i.e., transmit(m,fi).
Receiver. In our model, the receiver might reconstruct
the transmitted message m in mainly two ways: by either
simply receiving (during a time slot) the transmitted mes-
sage m or, as it will be clear in the following, by estimating
the energy associated to the frequency fi. In this latter case,
Table 1: Notation summary.
T , R, J transmitter, receiver, and jammer
m, m′ transmitted and received messages
Φ message dictionary
me, m
′
e transmitted and received encrypted messages
Lm length of the messages m, me, m
′, and m′e
mec, m
′
ec transmitted and received
encoded encrypted messages
Lc length of the messages mec and m
′
ec
Mi, M
′
i transmitted and received codewords
associated to the message bit mi
i slot time
si one time password
fi frequency used at slot time i
F , (A) number of available (jammed) frequencies
E(fi) physical layer function for estimating
the energy of the frequency slot fi
τ threshold for signal/jamming detection
H1(·), H2(·) cryptographically secure hash functions
pA proactive jamming probability
n codeword length
C∆n error correction code
ECC(·) C∆n encoding algorithm
ECC−1(·) C∆n decoding algorithm
ENC(·) symmetric encryption algorithm
DEC(·) symmetric decryption algorithm
pA maximum jamming probability resiliency
ǫ probability of successful message jamming
| · | size of the bit-string
recovering m requires multiple time slots — one of such es-
timations per time slot.
We envisage a very simple receiver equipped with a radio
and able to estimate the received signal strength, hereafter
RSS, i.e., we assume R is provided with a radio physical
layer function E(fi) which returns an average estimation
of the RSS values experienced during the frequency slot fi.
RSS estimation is a common feature in all the radio devices
in order to implement the medium access control. RSS pro-
vides an estimation of the current channel energy. Note that
recent papers have leveraged this information to detect the
presence of a jamming signal [22] [25], i.e., when a powerful
jamming attack is performed, the receiver experiences high
RSS values.
Therefore, in addition to the standard receiving behavior,
our receiver also senses and logs (into m′) whether the en-
ergy associated to that frequency exceeds a given threshold
τ . As a toy example, let us consider Fig. 1. For each time
slot i ∈ [0, . . . , 7], the receiver assesses the channel status
and sets m′i = 1 if the RSS overcomes the threshold τ (this
is the case if there is a transmission, jamming, or environ-
mental noise), while it sets m′i = 0 if it senses only noise
floor (RSS under τ ). Communicating leveraging radio si-
lence leads to the following definition:
Definition 1. We refer to slot i as a silent slot if the
energy detected by the receiver on the associated frequency
fi is below the threshold τ .
3.2 Adversarial model
1 1 10
τ
0 0 10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Time slots
Figure 1: Energy detection capability of the re-
ceiver: At each time slot, the receiver translates the
measured channel energy (RSS) to a bit value, i.e.,
it decides for “0”when the measured energy is under
the threshold τ , “1” otherwise.
We confront our solution against what, to the best of our
knowledge, is the most powerful adversary presented in the
literature. In particular, our adversary (J ), combines the
capability of the proactive jammer, of the reactive jammer,
and also network wide eavesdropping capabilities. In partic-
ular:
• J as a global eavesdropper. It is able to eavesdrop
all the communications in the network. In order to
achieve this, J might deploy multiple eavesdropping
stations all over the network, and moreover, we as-
sume each station is able to monitor the overall radio
spectrum.
• J as a reactive jammer. It is able to sense the on-
going communication and to jam it instantaneously,
while at the same time switching between the sensing
and the jamming procedures. Note that considering
this powerful (but yet realistic) type of adversary we
assume a conservative stance as for the security of com-
munications. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
strongest adversarial configuration ever assumed in lit-
erature for a reactive jammer.
• J as a proactive jammer. At each time slot, J
randomly chooses A among the F available frequencies
and jams them.
Therefore, at each time slot, if T is performing a transmis-
sion, J successfully jams it (whatever the transmission fre-
quency is). Otherwise, J jams A out of the F available
frequencies.
As a toy example, let us assume F = 1 and the commu-
nication scenario in Fig. 2. The transmitter sends to the
receiver 4 messages and the jammer successfully jams all of
them at time slots i ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7} (reactive jamming). More-
over, J generates a jamming signal during the time slot 2
(proactive jamming). Proactive jamming might appear use-
less in our adversarial model (all the communications are
already assumed as successfully jammed), nevertheless, as
it will be clear in the following, the silent slots are impor-
tant to our solution and therefore a proactive jammer has
an incentive in jamming them.
4. SiG PRELIMINARIES
In this section we introduce the rationales of the SiG pro-
tocol, while a detailed description will be provided in the
following section. Let us assume T has to transmit an 8 bits
J
T R
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Time slots
m’={0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1}
Figure 2: Communication scenario: The transmitter
(T ) delivers a sequence of messages to the receiver
(R). The jammer (J ) successfully jams all the mes-
sages. R logs to m′ the status of each time slot: 1
for jammed, 0 otherwise.
message (Lm = 8), that is: m = {0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1} (Fig. 1).
The transmitter behaves as follows: at each time slot i with
0 ≤ i ≤ 7, if mi == 1 than T transmits the whole m, oth-
erwise it waits for the next time slot.
As for the receiver, there can be tree cases: if R correctly
receives the message m (benign scenario) than it stops the
SiG protocol, otherwise, the receiver sets m′i = 1 if the RSS
exceeds the threshold τ , otherwise R sets m′i = 0. However,
recalling Section 3.2, J (being also a perfect reactive jam-
mer) is assumed to jam all the slots used by T to transmit
the message, as well as (being a proactive jammer) a few
more randomly selected slots (where some of them could
be silent slots). Therefore, let us consider again Fig. 2:
J successfully jams the slots i ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7} and also slot
2 (this latter one was intended by T to be a silent slot).
We observe that, although all the messages are successfully
jammed, after 8 time slots R is able to recover the bit string
m′ = {0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1} that differs from m for only one bit
— the silent slot (i = 2) jammed by J .
Similar to the Definition 1, we define an active slot as fol-
lows:
Definition 2. Slot i is an active slot if, on the associ-
ated frequency fi, the transmitter T is carrying out an active
communication by transmitting a message.
Silence is Golden. The SiG protocol interleaves silent
slots with active slots—slot i will be an active one if mi ==
1, a silent one otherwise. Both of them are fundamental
for the successful message transmission. In particular, while
active slots carry the message (or the “1”s of the message, if
the frequency fi is jammed) the silent slots carry the “0”s of
the message (or an error if the frequency fi is jammed).
In the following, we show how multiple transmissions can be
leveraged to mitigate the (proactive) jamming activity. This
feature, combined with channel-idiosyncratic error-correcting
code capabilities enable the full recovery of the original mes-
sage (m).
4.1 Leveraging frequency-hopping
In the following, we refine the baseline communication scheme
above introduced.
f0
f1
f2
f3
f4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Frequency selected and transmission: active communication
Frequency is not selected for the communication
Jamming
Frequency selected and radio silence: silent slot
Figure 3: Communication by frequency hopping: T
and R share a secret (s0) that is leveraged to gener-
ate the frequency hopping sequence.
As stated before, T and R choose in a pseudo-random fash-
ion the current communication channel within a set of F ≥ 1
frequencies. Increasing F makes the proactive jamming of
the current communication channel more difficult, since a
larger F decreases the probability of J to jam the silent
slots (communicating the “0”s of m).
In detail, T and R implement a frequency hopping scheme
[16] that makes the current communication frequency unpre-
dictable to the entities that do not share the initial secret
s0. A few solutions have been proposed in order to generate
a pseudo-random (shared) frequency starting from a shared
secret. In this work, we adopt the following formula:
fi = H1(si | i) mod F
whereH1(·) is a cryptographically secure hash function, e.g.,
SHA-1 [7], i is the current time slot, si is the shared secret
at time slot i and, finally, F is the total number of available
frequencies.
Figure 3 shows an example of transmission of an 8 bits
message. In particular, the frequency hopping sequence is
constituted by {f0, f1, f3, f4, f2, f3, f1, f2}, while the bits in-
volved in the communications are m = {0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1}.
Each of the above frequency fi might experience one of the
following three different states: silence (white box)—that is,
the sender intends to send a 0—; pure jamming (cross)—
that is, the frequency is not used by T , but it is jammed by
J –; or, jammed transmission (grey box with cross). We re-
call that J is able to jam all the transmissions that appear in
the radio channel, therefore none of the messages sent by the
transmitter will be correctly received by the receiver. Nev-
ertheless, at each time slot the receiver could still retrieve
the bit-message mi by assessing the status of the current
frequency slot fi. In fact, when mi == 1: T transmits
the message, J jams it, and finally, R detects that the RSS
associated to fi exceeds τ (indeed, frequency fi has been
jammed) and sets m′i == 1. Whereas, for each mi == 0: T
selects the radio channel fi but does not transmit the mes-
sage. R monitors fi and if no power is detected, decides for
m′i = 0. This is the case for time slots i ∈ {0, 4, 6}. How-
ever, we observe that J might jam a silent slot (frequency
fi used for a silent slot is randomly selected by the jammer
as well), as it happens in our example for time slot i = 2
—causing a one bit error (m′2) in the received sequence m
′.
11
0 0
1−p
A
pA
1
Figure 4: The inverted Z-channel: P (0 → 1) = pA
and P (1→ 1) = 0
Therefore, assuming F available frequencies and an adver-
sary able to jam A of them at each time slot, the probability
for a silent slot to be jammed (flipping a bit from 0 to 1) is
given by pA =
A
F
. Moreover, we highlight that, regardless of
J activities, the receiver is anyway able to retrieve at least
all the “1”s of the message.
4.2 Binary asymmetric error correcting codes
As stated in Section 4.1, J can always prevent the correct
reception of the messages, given its perfect reactive jam-
ming capabilities. However, R is still able to recover all the
“1”s of m. We stress that J cannot prevent the (active)
communication of the “1”s, in fact the only way to achieve
this is to remove the message from the radio spectrum, e.g.,
generating an inverse waveform to have the RSS sensed by
T resulting below the threshold τ . However, in the litera-
ture this feature is considered very difficult to achieve [2];
therefore, in the following we will assume such an event as
impossible—i.e. experiencing a bit transition from“1” to “0”
has associated probability 0. Nevertheless, J has a proba-
bility pA to jam a silent channel, that is changing the bit
value from “0” to “1”.
Communication channels characterized by an asymmetric
probability to experience a transition between zeros and
ones, such as the one above described, are said binary asym-
metric channels [10], hereafter BAC. In particular, BAC
characterized by P (0→ 1) = pA and P (1→ 1) = 0 are said
inverted Z-channels [10], see Fig. 4. The inverted Z-channel
shows a perfect fit to model our communication channel.
Mostly important, the error correcting codes (ECC) specifi-
cally designed for this channel might be used to recover the
error bits due to jamming over silent slots.
Let x and y be two bit strings (codeword) of n bits each
belonging to the code C. Let δ be the asymmetric distance,
i.e., the number of i′s such that mi = 0 and m
′
i = 1. Let
also ∆ = min{x,y∈C,x 6=y} δ(x, y) be the minimum asymmet-
ric distance. A fundamental theorem of the ECC theory [5]
follows:
Theorem 1. An asymmetric binary code of minimum asym-
metric distance ∆ is capable of correcting t or fewer errors
of type 0→ 1, where t is fixed and satisfies t ≤ ∆− 1.
Authors in [5] provide several constructions for asymmetric
binary error correction codes C∆n , given the codeword length
n and the minimum asymmetric distance ∆.
In the following, we consider the most resilient configura-
tion, i.e., n = ∆, that is able to correct up to n − 1 er-
rors. Now, let us assume a bit string me of Lm bits. In
order to be resilient to n − 1 consecutive jamming hits,
each bit mei of the message me is encoded with a code-
word Mi of length n bits, i.e., repeated n times. We adopt
me mec m’ec
m’eECC  −1
ENC si si DEC
Transmitter
ECC
Receiver
m m’
asymmetric
binary
channel
Figure 5: The SiG protocol: Transmitter and Re-
ceiver model. |m| = |me| = |m
′| = |m′e| = Lm and
|mec| = |m
′
ec| = Lc.
the following notation: mec = ECC(me) where me and
mec are bit-strings of Lm and Lc = nLm bits, respectively,
and mec = {M0, . . . ,MLm−1}. In particular, the i
th bit of
the message me is encoded into the n bits codewordMi, i.e.,
Mi = {0, . . . , 0} ifmei == 0, elseMi = {1, . . . , 1} ifmei ==
1. Conversely, the receiver runs the decoding algorithm, i.e.,
m′e = ECC
−1(m′ec), where m
′
ec = {M
′
0, . . . ,M
′
Lm−1} and
decides for mei == 1 if M
′
i = {1, . . . , 1}, otherwise it sets
m′ei == 0.
5. THE SiG PROTOCOL
The SiG protocol guarantees both confidentiality and in-
tegrity of the transmitted message. Each message m, before
being transmitted, is encrypted with a one-time-password
(OTP) si, i.e., me = ENC(m, si), where ENC(·) is a sym-
metric encryption algorithm (such as AES[14]), encrypting
message m with key si. At each time slot a new (shared)
secret key si is generated by both parties computing si =
H2(si−1), with i ≥ 1 — where H2(·) is a cryptographically
secure hash function [7]. Conversely, the receiver computes
m′ = DEC(m′e, si), whereDEC(·) is the symmetric decryp-
tion algorithm.
Figure 5 shows the overall model, while details are provided
in Section 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.
5.1 Transmitter
Algorithm 1 shows the sequence of steps performed by T in
order to transmit the bit-string m to the receiver R. The
transmitter algorithm needs as input the message m and the
shared (with R) secret si−1 (i ≥ 1). Assuming the current
time slot as i, the first step is to generate a new OTP, i.e.,
si at line 9. The new shared secret si will be used to both
encrypt the message m and generate the next transmission
frequency. The message encryption is obtained by means
of me = ENC(m, si) while the encoding is performed as:
mec = ECC(me), obtaining a bit-string of Lc = nLm bits
(line 11). Now, for each time slot i (in the next Lc slots),
the transmitter decides whether to transmit the message me
(line 16) or to stay silent (according to the bit value mec[i]
(line 18–19)). Each frequency slot is chosen according to
fi = H1(si | i) mod F (line 13).
Eventually, m is transmitted to R after nLm time slots with
an average of nLm
2
transmissions, assuming the distribution
of the bit values {0, 1} as uniform1.
5.2 Receiver
1We recall that me is encrypted, therefore we would expect
a uniform bit distribution [21].
Algorithm 1: Transmitter side
Input: Shared secret: si−1, Message: m
1 let m be a bit-string of Lm bits.
2 let si−1 be the shared secret with R at time slot i− 1.
3 let i be the current time slot.
4 let me be a bit-string of Lm bits.
5 let mec be a bit-string of Lc bits.
6 let ECC(·) be the ECC encoding algorithm.
7 let ENC(·) be a symmetric encryption algorithm.
8 let F be the number of available frequencies.
/* Generate a new OTP. */
9 si = H(si−1);
/* Encrypt the message m into me */
10 me = ENC(m, si);
/* Encode the bit-string me into the bit-string
mec */
11 mec = ECC(me);
12 for i = 1 . . . Lc do
/* Select the communication frequency */
13 fi = H1(si | i) mod F ;
/* Retrieve one bit from mec */
14 c = mec[i];
15 if c == 1 then
/* Transmit me at frequency f */
16 transmit(me, fi);
17 end
18 else
/* Wait till the next time slot */
19 end
20 end
The receiver algorithm (Algorithm 2) starts by synching
with T on the new shared secret key, i.e., si = H(si−1),
where i is the current time slot (line 10). If all the transmit-
ted messages have been successfully jammed by J , for each
of the next Lc time slots, R performs three steps: frequency
selection (line 13), channel energy measurement (line 20),
and decision on the value of the current bit (line 21—27).
The receiver syncs with the transmitter on the correct fre-
quency by means of fi = H1(si | i) mod F . The receiver
performs the message reception by means ofm′e = receive(fi),
decrypts m′e obtaining m
′, and finally, if the integrity check
of m′ is successful (m′ ∈ Φ), it sets the rx variable to true
(line 17). Nevertheless, our adversarial model assumes that
none of the message can be received correctly, i.e., J is able
to jam all the active communications.
Therefore, R leverages the channel energy in order to re-
construct the transmitted message. The receiver retrieves
the estimation of the energy on the current frequency slot
fi by means of the radio function e = E(fi). If the esti-
mated energy e overcomes the threshold τ , the receiver sets
m′ec[i] = 1, otherwise m
′
ec[i] = 0. Eventually, after Lc time
slots, the receiver firstly decodes the collected bits (m′ec) into
the bit-string m′e, and subsequently decrypts m
′
e obtaining
the message m′.
Finally, the receiver checks for the message integrity, i.e.,
m ∈ Φ, and returns m = m′ if the message is correct, oth-
erwise error (lines 33—38).
Packet loss. Generally speaking, packet loss is due to ra-
dio noise that corrupts the transmitted packets [18]. In our
communication model the correct reception of a bit at slot
i depends on the energy sensed over frequency fi. Hence,
in principle it could be possible that random energy fluctua-
tions in the channel might produce destructive interference,
causing the energy associated to frequency fi to be below the
threshold τ , eventually generating a crossover 1→ 0. How-
ever, in our reference scenario (that is, assuming the pres-
ence of J ), we observe that our adversarial model involves a
reactive jammer that (when a transmission is sensed) jams
the overall network with a very powerful signal. Since the
energy over frequency fi is increased by the jammer, the
jammer itself makes the probability of a crossover 1 → 0
negligible.
Finally, we stress that in any case a corrupted message can-
not be accepted as a genuine one. Indeed, the receiver R
eventually checks for the integrity of the message (line 33 in
Algorithm 2), and discards the message if it does not pass
the check.
5.3 Wrap up
The SiG protocol combines two key elements that make it-
self robust to jamming: (i) frequency hopping makes the
communication of the “0”s unpredictable, while (ii) the (ac-
tive) communication of “1”s cannot be prevented by J (i.e.
the transmission of “1”s is transparent to jamming).
We consider a simple example of the SiG protocol in Fig. 6.
In order to ease the discussion, we do not consider the en-
cryption step, therefore the bit-string m is directly encoded
into the bit-stream mec. Further, we assume a code C
∆
n ,
such that ∆ = n = 8, and consequently able to recover
t ≤ ∆− 1 = 7 errors, see Section 4.2 for the details. There-
fore, the initial bit-string m = {0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1} of length
Lm = 8 bits is encoded into the bit-stream mec of length
Lc = nLm = 64 bits. The communication channel is consti-
tuted by F = 5 frequencies: at each time slot the transmit-
ter and the receiver sync on one of them, and subsequently,
either a transmission or a radio silence is performed as func-
tion of the current value of the bit to be transmitted.
The jammer jams both all the transmitted messages and
(proactively) A = 1 of the F = 5 frequencies when no com-
munications appear on the radio spectrum. We observe that
J hits the 5th, 8th, 23rd, 37th, and the 54th silent slot, and
consequently, the bit-string m′ec differs from mec of 5 bits.
Nevertheless, the ECC code is able to correct up to t = 7
errors per codeword, and eventually the received message
m′ec allows to recover m.
We stress that under a standard proactive adversary (that
is, an adversary that with not zero probability fails to jam an
active communication), the SiG protocol delivers the mes-
sage m with the first not-jammed active communication.
Whereas, our adversary J successfully jams all the active
communications, and therefore SiG accomplishes the cor-
rect delivery of a single bit (“1”) per active communication.
Although J cannot prevent the delivery of the “1”s, it can
jam the transmission of the “0”s, changing their value to “1”.
6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In the following, we present the performance analysis of the
SiG protocol. We start our analysis from a theoretical point
of view providing a closed formula for the probability that
R, having derived m′ from the received message m′ec, cor-
Algorithm 2: Receiver side
Input : Shared secret: si−1
Output: Message m′ if m′ = m, otherwise error
1 let m′ be a bit-string of Lm bits.
2 let si−1 be the shared secret with R at time slot i− 1.
3 let i be the current time slot.
4 let m′e be a bit-string of Lm bits.
5 let m′ec be a bit-string of Lc bits.
6 let ECC−1(·) be the ECC decoding algorithm.
7 let DEC(·) be a symmetric decryption algorithm.
8 let F be the number of available frequencies.
9 let τ be the energy decision threshold.
/* Generate a new OTP. */
10 si = H(si−1);
11 i = 0; rx = false;
12 while i < Lc and not(rx) do
/* Select the communication frequency */
13 fi = H1(si | i) mod F ;
/* Receive the message m′e at the freq. fi */
14 m′e=receive(fi);
/* Decrypt m′e with si */
15 m′ = DEC(m′e, si);
/* Check m′ integrity */
16 if m′ ∈ Φ then
/* Message has been correctly received. */
17 rx = true;
18 end
19 else
/* Retrieve the channel energy. */
20 e = E(fi);
21 if e ≥ τ then
22 m′ec[i] = 1;
23 end
24 else
25 m′ec[i] = 0;
26 end
27 end
28 end
29 if not(rx) then
/* Decode m′ec into m
′
e */
30 m′e = ECC
−1(m′ec);
/* Decrypt m′e with si */
31 m′ = DEC(m′e, si);
32 end
/* Check m′ integrity */
33 if m′ ∈ Φ or rx then
34 return m′;
35 end
36 else
37 return error;
38 end
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Figure 6: An example of message transmission, jamming, and reception: the bit-string m = {1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0}
is encoded into the bit-string mec, and subsequently transmitted into a radio spectrum with F = 5 frequencies.
The jammer jams all the messages and a few silence slots flipping one or more bits (from 0 to 1). Finally,
the receiver recovers the original bit-string m by leveraging the error correcting code.
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Figure 7: The communication reference model for
the theoretical analysis.
rectly recovers the message m originally sent by T (we will
refer to this probability as P (m′ = m)). Such a proba-
bility will be dependant on the (proactive) jamming prob-
ability pa. We will assume, coherently with our adversary
model, that the reactive capabilities of the jammer allow it to
jam all the transmissions of T—hence, all the 1s of message
m are correctly received (cfr. Section 3.2). Subsequently,
we show and discuss the results of an extensive simulation
campaign—confirming our theoretical findings and the qual-
ity and viability of our proposal.
6.1 Theoretical analysis
Figure 7 recaps our communication reference model for the
theoretical analysis. In particular, we recall that each bit of
the message m, i.e. mi, is encoded into a codeword Mi of
n bits (as per Section 4.2), that is, mec = ECC(m), where
mec = {M0, . . . ,MLm−1}. The probability P (Mi = M
′
i)
that the codeword Mi, with i ∈ [0, Lm − 1], is correctly
delivered to R assuming the channel model of Fig. 7, is:
P (Mi =M
′
i) = P
(
δ(Mi,M
′
i) < n
)
(1)
where δ(Mi,M
′
i) is the asymmetric distance computed be-
tween Mi and M
′
i , i.e., the number of “0”s belonging to Mi
that change their value to “1” in the bit-string M ′i . We re-
call that, according to our communication model—justified
in previous sections and synthesized in Fig. 7—, the only
possible bit crossover is 0→ 1, while 1 → 0 is not possible.
Therefore, since the frequencies jammed by a proactive jam-
mer in any time slot are independent from the frequencies
jammed in other time slots, Eq. (1) can be rewritten as:
P (Mi =M
′
i) = 1− P
(
δ(Mi,M
′
i) = n
)
The probability to experience exactly one crossover 0→ 1 at
a given time slot of codeword Mi is given by the probability
pa that J successfully jams exactly that time slot (out of
the n silent slots) belonging to the codeword Mi. Therefore,
the probability to have the codeword Mi correctly decoded
at the receiver, yields:
P (Mi = M
′
i) = 1− p
n
a
Further, the probability to correctly deliver the bit-string
mec, i.e., P (mec = m
′
ec), can be computed as:
P (mec = m
′
ec) =
Lm−1∏
i=0
P (Mi =M
′
i)
Assuming the message m enjoys a uniform distribution of
zeros and ones (similar considerations expressed in footnote
1 do support this assumption) and recalling that, as justified
in Section 5.2 P (Mi = M
′
i | mi = 1) = 1 —no crossovers
1→ 0 occur—, the above equation can be rewritten as:
P (mec = m
′
ec) =
Lm−1
2∏
i=0
P (Mi =M
′
i | mi = 0)
= (1− pna)
Lm
2 (2)
The probability that R could recover an Lm bits long mes-
sagem sent by T and encoded with an ECC code C∆n , yields:
P (m = m′) = (1− pna)
Lm
2 ≥ e−p
n
a
Lm (3)
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Figure 8: Message delivery probability (P (m =
m′)) with the SiG protocol: the message length is
Lm = 128 bits, while the jamming probability has
been obtained by fixing F = 124 and varying A in
[0, . . . , 124]. We consider both experimental (error-
bars) and theoretical (curves) results for different
codeword lengths, i.e., n ∈ {8, 16, 32}.
Table 2: Bounds for the maximum jamming prob-
ability resiliency (pa) varying the codeword length
n ∈ {8, 16, 32} and fixing ǫ = 10−2.
n pa
8 0.30
16 0.55
32 0.74
Therefore, if we set to ǫ the upper bound on the probability
for J to successfully jam the message m (i.e. P (m′ 6= m) ≤
ǫ), the maximum jamming probability pa the protocol is
resilient to can be computed as:
pa =
n
√
−
1
Lm
ln(1− ǫ) (4)
6.2 Simulation results
We consider the reference scenario of Fig. 7, and the trans-
mission of a message m of length Lm = 128 bits. Figure 8
shows both theoretical and simulated results of the SiG pro-
tocol. Errorbars show the quantile 5, 50, and 95 of 10, 000
simulated transmissions of the message m. For each config-
uration, we derived the jamming probability pa by setting
the number of available frequencies to the constant F = 124,
while we varied the number of jammed frequencies A from
0 to 124. Moreover, we consider three different codeword
lengths, i.e., n ∈ {8, 16, 32}. Finally, the pointed curves rep-
resent the theoretical predictions provided by Eq. (3).
Table 2 shows the bounds on pa fixing ǫ = 0.99 and varying
n ∈ {8, 16, 32}; recalling Eq. (4), we can observe in Figure 8
how the bounds perfectly fit the experimental results. For
instance, note that SiG is able to deliver a 128 bit-string
with probability at least 99% (P (m = m′) ≥ 1 − ǫ), using
a codeword length of n = 16 in the presence of a jammer
J which proactively jams the 55% of the available frequen-
cies. Finally, we want to stress that our results are obtained
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Figure 9: Message delivery probability (P (m = m′))
with the SiG protocol: the message length spans in
the range Lm ∈ {128, 256, 512} bits, while the jamming
probability has been obtained by fixing F = 124 and
varying A in [0, . . . , 124]. We consider both experi-
mental (errorbars) and theoretical (curves) results
for a fixed codeword length n = 16.
assuming that the jamming is performed successfully on all
the active communications and on a subset (pa =
A
F
) of the
silent radio channels.
Varying the message length Lm. Figure 9 shows both
theoretical and simulated results of the SiG protocol varying
the message length Lm ∈ {128, 256, 512}. We fixed the code-
word length to n = 16, and we set the jamming probability
by fixing the number of available frequencies to F = 124,
while we varied the number of jammed frequencies A from 0
to 124. Errorbars show the quantile 5, 50, and 95 of 10, 000
simulated transmissions of the message m, while the curves
are obtained by plotting Eq. (3). Recalling Eq. (4), we ob-
serve that the bounds in order to guarantee a message de-
livery with at least 99% probability (P (m = m′) ≥ 1 − ǫ),
are given by pa ≤ pa = {0.55, 0.53, 0.51} for a message
of Lm = {128, 256, 512} bits, respectively, and a codeword
length n = 16.
Varying the threshold ǫ. Finally, we consider how the
successful message jamming probability ǫ = P (m 6= m′) af-
fects the performance of the SiG protocol. Equation (4) can
be rewritten as function of the codeword length, yielding:
n =
ln (− 1
Lm
ln (1− ǫ))
ln (pa)
(5)
Figure 10 shows Eq. (5) varying pa for different values of
the threshold ǫ ∈ {10−2, 10−4, 10−6}, with a message length
Lm = 128 bits. For instance, assuming a (proactive) jam-
ming probability pa =
A
F
= 0.8, we observe that a codeword
length n ranging in the interval [40, 80] assures a message
delivery probability of 1− ǫ, where ǫ ranges in [10−2, 10−6].
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Figure 10: Choosing the codeword length (n)
as function of the probability of jamming (pa).
We fixed the message length Lm = 128 bits and
considered different values for the threshold ǫ ∈
{10−2, 10−4, 10−6}.
7. COMPARISON WITH OTHER
SOLUTIONS
In this section we compare our solution with other anti-
jamming techniques: Table 3 compares SiG with other re-
cent works as function of the adversarial behavior. Firstly,
we recall that —to the best of our knowledge— the ad-
versary considered in this work (J ) is the most powerful
ever considered in the literature (see Section 3.2). Standard
techniques as [11][17] assume a “pure” proactive adversary,
and therefore cannot deal with J , in fact, both TDBS [11]
and UFH-UDSSS [17] are useless against a reactive jam-
mer that promptly interferes with the transmitted message.
In particular, TDBS changes the transmission frequency of
the peers according to a pre-loaded sequence; nevertheless,
the simple frequency hopping is useless against J , which
reactively jams the transmitted message as soon as it ap-
pears on the channel. Similarly, UFH-UDSSS combines both
uncoordinated frequency hopping and uncoordinated direct
spread spectrum: although this approach does not need a
pre-shared secret between the peers, a reactive adversary
like J disrupts the communications and prevents message
delivery.
A few solutions have been proposed in order to mitigate the
effects of a reactive adversary. The solution presented in
[22] introduces a novel technique to detect a reactive jam-
mer and raise a jamming suspicion alarm. Authors leverage
the combination of bit errors and RSS readings in order to
infer on the current presence of a jamming signal. Although,
this solution is optimal for the protection of a reactive alarm
system, it does not solve the problem of communicating in
the presence of a reactive jammer. A similar solution is pro-
posed by [26]: nodes that trigger the reactive jammer are
switched off and the messages are routed in order to avoid
the nodes close to jammers. This solution involves mainly
the identification of jammers’ position and does not deal
directly with the jamming attack, yet authors assume the
jammed area is a subset of the network deployment, and
therefore, the proposed solution is not effective against a J
Table 3: Comparison with other solutions as func-
tion of the J ’s behavior.
Name Proactive
adversary
Reactive
adversary
Multiple
adversaries
TDBS [11] X × X
UFH-UDSSS [17] X × X
[22] × X X
[26] × X X
BitTrickle [13] × X ×
AntiJam [19] × X X
[24] X X ×
SiG X X X
that can jam the whole network. An interesting solution
that directly deals with a reactive jammer is BitTrickle [13].
The solution leverages the delay experienced by a jammer
to switch between the sensing and the jamming phase in or-
der to correctly deliver a few bits per packet. Although the
authors assume a reactive jammer with unlimited spectrum
coverage and transmission power, the proposed solution is
not resilient to J . Indeed, in our adversarial model J expe-
riences a theoretically zero delay to switch between sensing
and jamming. e the frequency slotsused for the transmis-
sions). A MAC level solution is proposed in [19]: authors
design a protocol that guarantees fair channel access prob-
abilities among nodes in the presence of a reactive jammer.
Nevertheless, as for the previous solutions, even AntiJam
[19] cannot deal with J , in fact, to the best of our knowl-
edge, none of the solution proposed in the literature can deal
with the reactive jammer introduced in this paper.
Finally, the solution presented in [24] is the only one that
can be adopted in order to deal with a combined proactive-
reactive adversary. The solution is mainly based on a novel
mechanical beam-forming design with a fast auto-configuration
algorithm, i.e., the geometry of a two-element antenna is
controlled by an algorithm in order to obtain a destructive
interference for the received jamming signal. Nevertheless,
such an approach cannot deal with multiple deployed ad-
versaries or even against a single mobile adversary: indeed,
antenna cancellation is achieved with respect to only a spe-
cific (static) adversarial position.
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have introduced a powerful (yet realistic)
jammer that is able to reduce to zero the communication
bandwidth between two communicating parties, even when
state of the art anti-jamming solutions are adopted. To cope
with this novel adversary model, we have introduced a brand
new communication protocol: Silence is Golden (SiG).
Implementing a tunable, asymmetric communication chan-
nel between communicating parties, SiG is able to restore
an effective bandwidth between them. We have provided a
thorough analysis of the SiG protocol, as well as the results
of an extensive simulation campaign that do support our
theoretical findings and the viability of the SiG protocol.
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